Abstract: Reducing illicit methamphetamine (meth) labs poses many unique challenges. For more than 30 years, the government's strategy has relied on controlling certain chemicals and precursors used by amateur chemists (called "cooks") to make meth. Some states have pursued additional controls, including, for example, requiring prescriptions for popular drug products that can be used as meth precursors. In this paper we review the government's anti-meth strategies and assess their effectiveness. Our findings suggest that, historically, precursor controls have caused only limited and temporary disruptions in meth production because cooks are quick to adapt and use alternate methods for making meth. Our data review uncovered limitations in a national database that has been used for more than a decade by federal and state agencies to track meth production and formulate anti-meth strategies. The continued use of these data, we conclude, has contributed to wasteful federal spending that, in turn, has distorted the scope and nature of the domestic meth lab problem.
Introduction and Background
In 1980, the U.S. Government reported that domestic clandestine laboratories were producing about 95 percent of the meth sold in the U.S., with the remaining 5 percent imported from Canada (The National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee 1980). Since then, these ratios have been reversed. In 2010, the U.S. Government estimated that 80 percent of the meth consumed in the U.S. was imported, mainly from Mexico, with approximately 20 percent produced domestically (Drug Enforcement Administration 2010).
From P2P to Pseudoephedrine
In the 1970s, the most popular method for making meth included phenyl-2-propanone (P2P), an organic compound also known as phenylacetone or benzyl methyl ketone. This substance was cheap, unregulated, and available in bulk quantities. By 1980, the government had added P2P to Schedule II of the federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA) (Federal Register 1979) .
The control of P2P drove meth traffickers to unregulated precursor substances, primarily pseudoephedrine and ephedrine. Structurally similar to meth, these over-the-counter (OTC) drugs could be transformed into meth using readily available chemicals and equipment (Klein, Sapienza, and McClain 1989) .
Regulating Ephedrine & Pseudoephedrine
The Chemical Diversion and Trafficking Act of 1988 created a new class of regulated substances called scheduled listed chemical products. By November 1989, ephedrine, pseudoephedrine and phenylpropanolamine 1 were designated scheduled listed chemicals and placed under control. The Act, however, contained a major loophole that weakened its effect. Although bulk shipments were regulated, tablets, capsules, and other finished products, including OTC ephedrine and pseudoephedrine products, were exempted (Cunningham and Liu 2003) . This loophole was partially closed by the passage of the Domestic Chemical Diversion Control Act of 1993 that regulated ephedrine products. The Act redesignated scheduled listed chemical products as List I and List II Chemicals and required registration by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) for anyone buying or selling them in bulk. This was followed three years later by the Comprehensive Methamphetamine Control Act of 1996 that, among other things, placed federal controls on additional precursors and lab equipment used to make illicit meth (Cunningham and Liu 2003; Library of Congress 2013) .
Combat Methamphetamine Epidemic Act of 2005 (CMEA)
Faced with what some were calling an "epidemic" of meth abuse, Congress enacted the Combat Methamphetamine Epidemic Act of 2005 (CMEA) to regulate the last remaining open access point for OTC meth precursors: the retail pharmacy (U.S. Congress 2005) . The CMEA regulates retail sales of (formerly) OTC products containing ephedrine, pseudoephedrine, and phenylpropanolamine by setting daily and 30-day purchase limits (3.6 g and 9 g, respectively) per purchaser, regardless of the number of transactions. Retail sellers must place pseudoephedrinecontaining medicines "behind the counter" (BTC) and maintain logbooks that: a) describe products sold by name and quantity; b) identify purchasers by name and address; and c) record the date and time of each sale. Sellers must verify logbook entries, check the purchaser's photo ID, and require purchasers to sign the logbook before a sale can be completed (U.S. Congress 2005; Drug Enforcement Administration 2006a) .
The effects of the CMEA were swift and dramatic. By 2007, the number of meth-related hospital ED admissions was cut almost in half (-48.7 %) The CMEA's effect on domestic meth labs was even more impressive. In 2004, the DEA reported 23,829 "Meth Clandestine Laboratory Incidents." By 2007, only four years later and one year after the CMEA took effect, this number was reduced to 6,858 incidents -a remarkable decline of 71.2 percent (Drug Enforcement Administration 2013a).
Adapting to the CMEA: Moving from Stovetop Labs to Mobile Labs
Before 1980, a common method for synthesizing meth often began by mixing P2P with N-methylformamide, an industrial solvent, in a flask immersed in an oil bath heated to a specific temperature to cause a series of chemical reactions that, in turn, produced crystalized meth. Over time, variations in these "stovetop" recipes were devised to compensate or substitute for chemicals whose sales were restricted by DEA regulations. This, in turn, resulted in wider use of OTC ephedrine, pseudoephedrine, and phenylpropanolamine -until that is, the enactment of the CMEA in 2005. By the end of 2006, CMEA-imposed restrictions on pseudoephedrine sales significantly reduced its availability in bulk for those using conventional or "stovetop" methods to make meth.
3 This also affected so-called super labs (production capacity per session of ≥ 10 pounds of finished meth (Drug Enforcement Administration 2005)). As a result, most domestic super labs relocated to Mexico where bulk supplies of pseudoephedrine still could be acquired. The CMEA's success in reducing the number of stovetop labs and super labs resulted in a heightened interest in what meth addicts called the one-pot 4 method for producing meth. This process uses common household chemicals 3 By 2006, as a result of other legislative and administrative actions, products containing ephedrine and phenylpropanolamine were no longer marketed in the U.S. as OTC drugs. 4 Also known as the "shake and bake" method. mixed in a makeshift vessel, often an empty two-liter plastic soda bottle, with pseudoephedrine tablets to produce small, user-quantities of finished meth, usually less than 3 g per package of pseudoephedrine tablets. The quantity of pseudoephedrine used in this method is within the daily purchase limit (3.6 g) set by the CMEA.
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As of March 2016, there are 40 FDA-approved non-prescription 6 products containing pseudoephedrine on the market, only five of which are single entity formulations preferred by meth cooks. 7 The five single entity products are sold as solid dosage units in strengths of 120 mg and 240 mg. The 120 mg tablets are available in packages of 10 or 20 tablets, while the 240 mg tablets are only available in packages of 10 tablets (Food and Drug Administration 2016) . One package of 20 tablets of 120 mg pseudoephedrine or one package of 10 tablets of 240 mg pseudoephedrine would amount to 2.4 g of pseudoephedrine, well within the CMEA's daily purchase limit of 3.6 g. To remain within the legal purchase limit of 9 g in thirty days, a retailer could lawfully sell this amount to an individual three times (with each sale taking place on a separate day to comply with the daily purchase limit of 3.6 g). Of greater concern was what was happening behind the scenes. The previously mentioned one-pot method for making small quantities of meth was growing in popularity, especially among abusers who had come to rely on purchasing meth produced by domestic super labs no longer in business.
5 It should be noted that some states have set lower daily sales limits than the federal statute. 6 Under federal law a prescription for pseudoephedrine is not required but, as of January 2016, two states (OR & MS) have prescription-only laws for obtaining pseudoephedrine products. 7 Combination products containing pseudoephedrine can be used to make meth but this requires additional processing to extract and recover the pseudoephedrine from the combination product.
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While super labs in Mexico and along the southern U.S. border continued to provide the bulk of meth sold in the U.S., the one-pot method of domestic production began to account for a sizable amount. Testifying before the Senate in 2006, a senior DEA official described the one-pot phenomenon -officially referred to as small toxic laboratories or STLs as being responsible for approximately 20 percent of the meth consumed in the U.S. (Drug Enforcement Administration 2006b).
The growth of the small toxic lab in the post-CMEA era introduced new concepts to the meth trade: smurfing is an activity by meth cooks/users (called smurfers) to acquire just under the legal limit quantities of BTC pseudoephedrine tablets for conversion to meth. Smurfers, working alone or in groups, typically purchase up to their CMEA-imposed daily limit of pseudoephedrine from multiple retailers. In states with electronic logbook systems that calculate running totals by daily and 30-day periods for each purchaser (according to their furnished photo-ID), smurfers have been known occasionally to use multiple false IDs to thwart detection. Evaluates Efforts to Address Nation's Meth Problem
In April 2011, the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control (SCINC) asked the GAO to evaluate federal and state efforts to reduce the manufacture, production, and distribution of meth (Feinstein and Grassley 2011) . Two years later, GAO issued a 64-page response that addressed some of the questions posed by the SCINC (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2013). The GAO response, like the Senate's letter, relied heavily on information from the National Seizure System (NSS), a drug intelligence database managed by DEA and used by multiple government agencies as a common source of information about meth lab seizures.
8 Electronic logbook systems are designed to notify the point of sale person when a proposed purchase will exceed the CMEA daily or 30-day limit and, therefore, should not be made. An "override" is permitted if the person feels threatened. The override action will be documented in the system and made available to authorized officials.
The National Seizure System (NSS)
The NSS had its origin in 2000 when the Counterdrug Intelligence Plan was approved and called for the DEA's El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) to "coordinate the development of a process to capture drug seizure data at the state and local level." This resulted in the creation of the Clandestine Laboratory Seizure System that later was renamed the National Seizure System (Department of Justice 2013a; Department of Justice, Office of Inspector General, and Evaluation and Inspections Division 2010).
In the preparation of this paper, reports from at least five major federal agencies that routinely use NSS data were reviewed. Despite citing the same source (i.e., NSS), discrepancies were found in these reports for "total meth lab incidents" and "meth lab seizures."
9 In some cases, these discrepancies were significant. (See Table 1 )
Office of Inspector General Evaluates NSS
In 2010, the Department of Justice Office of Inspector General (OIG) evaluated the NSS and, among its findings, reported the following:
The National Seizure System EPIC maintains is not a complete record of drug seizures made by U.S. law enforcement, and as a result, intelligence products based on analysis of the seizure data contained in this system may be incomplete or inaccurate. Inspections Division 2010). Despite these findings, agencies have continued to rely on NSS data (See Table 1 ).
As the OIG's report noted, state and local agencies are under no obligation to report their meth lab seizure information to the NSS, and, in fact, very few actually make such reports if they are not otherwise seeking to obtain federal lab cleanup funds from DEA.
As it turns out, states frequently pay their own lab cleanup costs, especially when the labs are small or of the one-pot variety and the amount of hazardous waste is minimal. 
Meth Initiative Grants
Besides lab cleanup funds, between 1998 and 2013, Congress provided the COPS program with more than $500 million to manage what it called "Meth Initiative" grants intended to "assist state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies in combating methamphetamine production and distribution…." (Department of Justice and Office of Community Oriented Policing Services 2012). In 2006, the OIG audited the Meth Initiative program and criticized the COPS office for failing to supervise grants furnished to the states. The problem, the OIG conceded, was in large part the fault of Congress and the way the funds were apportioned:
Most of the money that the COPS Office receives comes in the form of congressional earmarks. An earmark refers to funds designated by Congress for a specified purpose, project, activity, institution, or location. Congress has designated approximately 84 percent of appropriated Meth Initiative funds to specific entities or locales for the past 8 years. Earmarked funds do not require projects to be vetted for duplication, necessity, fiscal accountability, or any other factor normally reviewed by a granting agency through the solicitation and selection process. (Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, and Audit Division 2006, p. iii)
10 The IG's clandestine lab audit report indicates that the average cost per cleanup of small labs is less than $500.
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The OIG singled out several examples to justify its criticism. Hawaii, despite being ranked by NSS data as number 41 of 50 states in reported lab incidents for the decade ending in 2011, received $17.1 million in Meth Initiative funds, the third largest share of federal funds allocated by the COPS program for this purpose. Hawaii reported only 60 meth lab for the entire decade. This was 0.18 percent of all meth labs (n = 33,134) Vermont, next-to-last in state ranking for meth labs, according to NSS data, had 9 reported lab incidents for the entire decade but still managed to attract $5.8 million in Meth Initiative funds from the COPS program. This represented a theoretical cost to the taxpayers of $648,709.00 per lab.
The OIG used Vermont to illustrate the haphazard funding of the Meth Initiative:
The Vermont State Police received congressionally earmarked grant funds to: (1) combat meth production and distribution; (2) target drug "hot spots"; and (3) remove and dispose hazardous materials at clandestine meth labs. While the grantee used a portion of the grant to provide meth training to law enforcement and citizens, we noted that the state of Vermont only reported one meth lab seizure to EPIC between FY 1998 and FY 2004. Primarily, the grantee used the Meth Initiative funds to operate a task force that targeted heroin. 
Federalizing Local Crime
Some believe that federal grant programs like the Meth Initiative allow grantees to supplant a portion of their operational expenses (Muhlhausen and Little 2007) . Federal rules generally forbid this practice but they are seldom enforced, especially when funds are earmarked by Congress. By comparison, state and local law enforcement agencies seeking discretionary federal grants (i. e., funds that are not earmarked by Congress) typically must submit detailed written proposals that justify the grant and, among other things, describe how the grantees intend to pursue some stated goal(s) of the grantor. 
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An important distinction exists for federal-state collaborative efforts that address serious interstate and international drug crimes. Combining federal and state resources to pursue super labs, for example, or major interstate and international drug trafficking cartels unquestionably is justified, according to longstanding traditions of federalism and public safety jurisprudence.
Arguably, small toxic meth labs of the one-pot variety that produce no more than user-quantities of meth from locally obtained precursors and chemicals do not merit prosecution as federal crimes. Although the production, possession, or distribution of any controlled substance, regardless of amount, technically violates federal drug laws, government guidance for federal prosecutors discourages bringing charges unless there is a substantial federal interest ("It is important that limited Federal resources not be wasted in prosecuting inconsequential cases or cases in which the violation is only technical.") (Department of Justice 2013b).
The congressional authors of the CMEA may have considered this when deciding to regulate sales, rather than purchases, of scheduled listed chemical products. As previously noted, the CMEA imposes civil penalties for unauthorized or excessive sales -not purchases -of regulated products. A purchaser who exceeds his or her statutory daily or 30-day limit of pseudoephedrine purchases may attract the attention of the authorities, but the mere fact that he or she has exceeded the authorized purchase limit, by itself, does not constitute a federal crime -unless there is evidence of fraud or evidence of a nexus between the excessive purchase(s) and an illicit meth activity.
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Electronic Blocking of Excessive Sales of Pseudoephedrine
The CMEA brought precursor controls to the local pharmacy where the logbook provision, considered essential, was viewed by some pharmacists as a timeconsuming element of compliance. To overcome this, software designers have modified computerized pharmacy point-of-sale programs to comply with the statute's logbook requirements. Signing a card-reader screen, for example, when paying for a purchase of pseudoephedrine meets the statutory requirement for a purchaser's signature. As a result, the electronic logbook has replaced the paper logbook in many chain and independent pharmacies.
12
Many electronic logbook programs contain a stop-sale feature that alerts a sales clerk at the point of sale that a proposed purchase will exceed the daily or running 30-day limit of pseudoephedrine. Critics of electronic logbook systems claim that smurfers can defeat the stop-sale feature by using false IDs to circumvent purchase limits. They recommend, instead, that a nationwide (federal) prescription-only law be adopted for all pseudoephedrine products.
Discussion
In retrospect, it appears that the decision to ban chemicals and precursor substances in the expectation that it would permanently reduce or eliminate the illicit production of meth neglected to take into account the ability of traffickers to adapt and find alternative methods to make meth. This should not be viewed as a criticism of regulatory controls but, instead, an acknowledgement of their limitations.
The goal of establishing a national database for drug seizure data was ambitious but short-sighted. Simply put, it was unrealistic to expect that state and local law enforcement authorities would voluntarily report drug seizure data to a centralized federal authority. Using the lure of federal funds to encourage such reporting did not solve the problem, according to the OIG report, and arguably made it worse by skewing the intelligence. As the OIG found, generous congressional earmarks haphazardly funneled to undeserving recipients by congressional earmarks passed through a poorly managed COPS program likely wasted millions of dollars.
As a policy issue, the absence of a taxonomy to differentiate meth labs according to their relative importance appears to have contributed to the NSS deficiencies. The result -affording a small toxic lab the same policy significance as a fixed or super lab -produced an exaggerated threat analysis that, in turn, often was used to justify providing (or continuing to provide) federal resources to local police departments in pursuit of what arguably were local crimes having minimal national significance.
12 The logbook requirement of the CMEA permitted "a written or electronic list of such sales that identifies the products by name, the quantity sold, the names and addresses of purchasers, and the dates and times of the sales." (U.S. Congress 2005, p. 68, Title VII, Sect. 711(e)(1)(A)(iii)) The Methamphetamine Production Prevention Act of 2008 clarified information entry and signature requirements for implementing an electronic logbook in lieu of using a bound paper logbook (Federal Register 2013) .
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With respect to the NSS, we can think of no good reason for not publishing its data, at least in a redacted form suitable for statistical and planning purposes. If its data had been published from the outset, even in a redacted form, the flaws and limitations noted by the OIG and the inconsistencies in statistics cited by various government agencies over the years might have been avoided.
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Despite controversy surrounding the NSS, the government's other drug data systems generally show that current meth abuse levels, while unacceptably high, remain below 2005 levels that serve as a pre-CMEA baseline. The government's Monitoring the Future (MTF) survey of young adults (19 to 28-year-olds) reported an annual prevalence rate of meth use fluctuating between 2.4 percent and 2.8 percent in a seven-year period before the CMEA. The same measure in 2015 was at 0.5 percent, a rate reduction of 82.1 percent from the pre-CMEA high of 2.8 percent (Johnston et al. 2014 ; National Institute on Drug Abuse 2016).
In 2004, a year before passage of the CMEA and two years before it took effect, the nationwide per capita rate for persons admitted to hospital EDs for misuse or abuse of meth was 45.3 per 100,000 persons. In 2011, the most recent year for which published data are available, the nationwide per capita rate for persons admitted to hospital EDs for misuse or abuse of meth was 33 per 100,000 persons -a sizable rate drop of 27.2 percent (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 2013).
Admissions to treatment facilities for amphetamine (i. e., meth) addiction, according to the government's Treatment Episode Data Set (TEDS), peaked in 2005, the year before the CMEA took effect, when there were 172,165 admissions for amphetamine treatment reported in the U.S. By 2012, the last year for which we have complete data, the number of these admissions had declined by 27 percent (to 125,651 admissions) (Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration 2013b).
There are two additional government data systems that provide inferential drug abuse data. The first is the DEA's National Forensic Laboratory Information System (NFLIS) that tracks law enforcement acquisitions of drugs.
14 Using NFLIS data for meth items and constructing a ratio with regional population as a denominator, the rate reported in 2005 -the year before the CMEA took effect -was 235.9 meth items per 100 thousand population in the West region. This was almost twice the combined rates for the other three regions (Northeast: 1.5/100k; Midwest: 58.9/100k; and South: 59.4/100k) (Drug Enforcement Administration, Office of Diversion Control). In 2012, the rate for the West (141.7/100k) continued to remain more than the rates for the other three regions combined (Northeast: 3.5/100k; Midwest: 47/ 100k; and South: 58.4/100k) (Drug Enforcement Administration, Office of Diversion Control). Although the regional populations vary, the magnitude of the West's rate is so great as to offset the rate variances attributed to regional population differences. A significant limitation in this database, however, results from variances in state forensic policies. Drug evidence seized by state and local police in cases that result in a guilty plea or dismissal may not be analyzed and, therefore, not included in NFLIS.
The second and final government data system of interest in this discussion is the NSS itself. Using data from the aforementioned GAO report to the Senate and graphing it for the decade of 2002-2011 and then for just 2011, the problem of meth lab incidents appears localized in just over a handful of states. It is worth noting that the NSS's six-state concentration of meth lab incidents is not corroborated by NFLIS data. According to the NFLIS database, forensic examination of meth items was heavily concentrated among Western states -none of which was among the top six states reporting meth lab incidents to the NSS in 2011. (See Figure 3) It is beyond the scope of this paper to investigate this incongruity. It likely results from a confluence of the aforementioned flaws in the NSS combined with the limitations of NFLIS noted in the text.
Besides these law enforcement strategies, the states of Oregon and Mississippi in 2006 and 2010, respectively, decided to enact state statutes requiring prescriptions for all products containing pseudoephedrine (National Alliance for Model State Drug Laws 2015). Similar provisions have been passed by a number of cities in Missouri and Tennessee. These prescription-only laws have attracted widespread national interest and, as of 2013, at least eight additional states have considered legislation that would make pseudoephedrine a controlled substance under state law and available via prescription-only (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2013). Cunningham and colleague (2012) studied the impact of moving pseudoephedrine products from OTC (or BTC) to prescription-only in Oregon and concluded that it had "no significant impact" on reducing lab activity (Cunningham et al. 2012) . The Cunningham team, however, found that the very opposite was true in Mississippi where the state's prescription-only requirement was associated with a significant reduction (-50.2 %) in meth lab seizures. The researchers attributed this to the state's relatively large number of meth labs to begin with, a condition that differed from Oregon where a 2004 state law requiring pseudoephedrine to be placed behind the counter already had reduced the number of labs in the state by the time that the prescription-only law took effect two years later (Cunningham et al. 2012) . 15 We should note that the GAO response to the Senate's inquiry discussed in the text of this paper differed with the conclusions of Cunningham et al (2012) . Contrary to Cunningham's findings, the GAO analysis "found that the lab seizure rate fell significantly in Oregon after the prescription-only policy was implemented...." (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2013, p. 32) In their elegant statistical modeling for evaluating Oregon's prescription-only requirement on domestic meth production, GAO analysts used lab seizure data reported to DEA's NSS between 2002 and 2010. In a footnote, the GAO team acknowledged that "Methamphetamine seizure incidents were not completely captured by the NSS. Throughout 2012, EPIC added more than 30,000 new incidents from the HAZARD system into NSS. These incidents occurred in the period 1998 through 2012...." (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2013, p. 55, FN6). The GAO report did not identify the "HAZARD system" or who compiles it, what information it captures, and for what purpose.
Conclusions
We conclude that federal efforts to control domestic meth production have followed an inefficient strategy of trying to control precursors and small-scale meth producers. This approach diverts scarce resources from the real threat, which is the availability and trafficking of meth produced and sold in the U.S. by Mexican drug cartels. The government's approach to the problem and its strategies for dealing with it, continue to be based, in part, on using flawed data from the NSS. This, coupled with the lack of a standard taxonomy for distinguishing meth labs by their known or estimated production capacity, has resulted in small toxic labs being afforded the same policy significance as fixed super labs. As we show in the text, this not only distorts the government's threat analysis, but also results in wasteful federal spending.
In 2009 and 2010, the DEA-managed High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) state and local task force program that is funded by the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) evaluated its meth control program by organizing HIDTA meth lab seizures by size and quantity of meth that each lab could produce in one batch. (Table 2 ) Despite its clear usefulness for policy analysis, this taxonomy was the only one of its kind found in the literature and it was used only for comparing HIDTA meth lab seizures for the two years cited.1,2.
We conclude federal funds used to encourage state and local participation in the NSS likely skewed the data stream. It produced dependent relationships between federal and state law enforcement authorities that, in turn, made solving local crimes federal priorities.
We conclude that the NSS is not -and has not been -a reliable system for tracking seizures of meth labs and meth lab incidents. 16 In addition, as the OIG's report suggested, analyses and strategies formulated on the basis of NSS data may have been flawed and need to be reevaluated, as was assured by the OIG's 2010 report but never followed up by ONDCP or the Department of Justice.
16 In November 2013, DEA published its National Drug Threat Assessment Summary for 2013. Until this past year, the National Drug Threat Assessment was published annually by the National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC). In mid-year 2013, NDIC was discontinued and its tasks apportioned to several federal agencies, including the DEA. In the first National Drug Threat Assessment Summary by DEA, the section pertaining to the meth threat assessment mentions several of the statistical measures of abuse discussed in the text of this paper but says nothing about meth lab seizures or meth lab incidents and does not mention the NSS. Perhaps the agency has finally reached the same conclusion as the IG and ONDCP about the credibility of this persistently flawed database (Drug Enforcement Administration 2013c).
Moreover, the lack of verification or quality control of NSS data further undermined whatever credibility and usefulness they may have had.
17
We conclude that the issue of prescription-only versus BTC status for pseudoephedrine should be studied further. As we have seen with Oregon, prescription-only has done little to reduce the availability or abuse of meth other than, perhaps, to reduce the number of small toxic labs. Prescription-only, however, did make a significant difference in Mississippi where meth lab seizures dropped by more than half after the prescription-only law went into effect.
Using the NSS as the only available, albeit flawed, data source of its kind, we noted that in 2011, six states -IL, OK, IN, KY, MO, and TN -accounted for more than two-thirds (69 %) of all meth lab incidents in the U.S. It is likely that most of these lab incidents involved small toxic labs with each producing two ounces or less of meth. In 2011, more than one-third (19/50) of the states reported fewer than 10 meth lab incidents and four states reported none at all. This is more suggestive of a regional, not a national, problem and, as such, may be responsive to a local, not national, solution. 17 National Seizure System reports carry the following caveat: "Notice: This document includes only that information that has been reported to EPIC by contributing agency/ies and may not necessarily reflect total seizures nationwide. Data in this document is reported without corroboration, modification, or editing by EPIC, and, accordingly, EPIC can not (sic) guarantee the timeliness, completeness, or accuracy of the information reported herein. The data and any supporting documentation relied upon by EPIC to prepare this report are the property of the originating agency."
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We conclude that the electronic logbook system provides an effective and cost-free means for retailers and law enforcement authorities to ensure compliance with state and federal laws on limiting sales/purchases of pseudoephedrine. Of note, each of the aforementioned six states with the highest number of meth lab incidents in 2011 is a participant in the NPLEx electronic logbook program.
We conclude that improvements to the NPLEx system should be pursued, including suggestions to establish an automatic link between NPLEx and NLETS, the state-run national law enforcement network that, among other things, provides instant online verification of driver's licenses. This would reduce the incidence of ID fraud by smurfers.
Finally, we conclude that additional efforts need to be made by federal authorities to address and remediate the environmental damage caused by clandestine meth production. The chemicals used in the production of meth, whether in super labs, stovetop labs or the one-pot mobile labs, are extremely toxic and volatile. They often are discharged from the production facilities directly into municipal sewer systems, local rivers and streams, or directly on the ground where they poison the environment indefinitely. In recognition of the health hazards associated with clandestine drug labs, the Department of Justice and DEA maintain a public website of all known locations, by state, county, and street address, where law enforcement authorities have reported finding chemicals and other items identified with abandoned or seized clandestine drug lab sites.
18 This important source of information is provided free as a public service.
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